Note: This page shows an example threat model for a Progressive Web Application (PWA). CycleTracker is a menstrual cycle tracking PWA that stores only start and end dates in localStorage without third party or external scripts. It can be considered safer than many cloud‑based alternatives. However, even minimal cycle data can reveal sensitive reproductive information, so it makes sense to assess its security in a threat model.
For more information and guidance on how to create a threat model, see the threat modeling guide.
This threat model covers CycleTracker, a menstrual cycle tracking PWA that stores only start and end dates in localStorage without third party or external scripts.
| ID | Component | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C1 | PWA frontend | HTML/CSS/JS |
| C2 | Local storage | Cycle data stored in browser |
| C3 | Service worker | Caching static assets |
| C4 | PWA manifest + icons |
| ID | Asset | Description |
|---|---|---|
| A1 | Cycle start dates | |
| A2 | Cycle end dates | |
| A3 | Derived cycle patterns | Inferred from A1/A2 |
| ID | Flow | Description |
|---|---|---|
| F1 | Data submission | User enters cycle dates which gets written to localStorage |
| F2 | App load | Browser loads PWA assets over HTTPS or from a Service Worker |
| ID | Dependency | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| E1 | Web Browser | Assuming default security settings like sandboxing, storage isolation, etc. |
| E2 | Device | Assuming updated OS, lock screen, malware protection |
| E3 | Hosting | Assuming safe guards, provide safeguards, such as DDoS protection |
| ID | Stakeholder | Interests / potential harm |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | Cycle tracking user | Account safety, data protection |
| S2 | Developer | Maintainer of code base |
| S3 | Anonymous users | Anyone with physical access to the device |
| ID | Threat | Affected elements | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Local device access | C2, A1–A3, F2, S3 | Someone with physical access to the device opens the PWA and views cycle data. |
| T2 | Shared browser profile exposure | C2, A1–A3, E1, S1 | Another person using the same browser profile sees stored cycle data. |
| T3 | Browser/OS sync leakage | C2, A1–A3, E2 | Browser or operating system sync or backup uploads localStorage to cloud accounts. |
| T4 | Malicious browser extensions | C2, A1–A3, E1 | Extensions with broad permissions read or modify localStorage. |
| T5 | XSS | C1, C2, A1–A3, 1 | Injection vulnerability leading to data theft / attacker can read localStorage. |
| T6 | Compromised service worker | C3, F2 | A malicious or tampered service worker exfiltrates data or alters app behavior. |
| T7 | Hosting compromise | C1, C3, A1-A3, E3 | Attacker modifies hosted JS to steal localStorage data. |
| T8 | Device malware | C2, A1–A3, E2 | Malware on the device reads storage. |
| T9 | Data corruption | C2, A1-A-3, F1 | localStorage becomes corrupted, losing cycle data. |
| T10 | Inference attacks | A1–A3 | Even minimal data reveals missed periods or pregnancy likelihood. |
| T11 | Service worker DoS | C3, F2 | Broken or malicious SW prevents app from loading offline. |
| T12 | Legal or forensic seizure | A1–A3, S3 | Authorities accessing the device can read cycle data. |
| T13 | Lookalike malicious forks | C1, C3, S1 | A forked version mimics the PWA but steals data. |
| Threat | Response ID | Strategy | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Local device access | Reduce | Encourage users to secure their device with a passcode/biometrics. |
| T1 | Local device access | Reduce | Optional app-level PIN or passphrase. |
| T2 | Shared browser profile exposure | Reduce | Provide guidance to use private browsing or separate profiles. |
| T2 | Shared browser profile exposure | Reduce | Add "Delete all data" button. |
| T3 | Browser sync leakage | Reduce | Document that browser sync may upload data. |
| T4 | Malicious extensions | Accept | Outside app control; warn users about extension risks. |
| T5 | XSS | Reduce | Apply strict Content Security Policy. |
| T5 | XSS | Reduce | Avoid inline scripts. |
| T5 | XSS | Reduce | Keep code simple and auditable. |
| T6 | Compromised service worker | Reduce | Keep SW minimal. |
| T6 | Compromised service worker | Reduce | Use versioning and integrity checks. |
| T6 | Compromised service worker | Reduce | Avoid dynamic script loading. |
| T7 | Hosting compromise | Reduce | Use HTTPS only hosting (required). |
| T7 | Hosting compromise | Reduce | Monitor repository integrity. |
| T7 | Hosting compromise | Reduce | Encourage users to code their own app or trust only official deployments. |
| T8 | Device malware | Accept | Outside our control; recommend OS updates and antivirus. |
| T9 | Data corruption | Reduce | Validate localStorage writes. |
| T9 | Data corruption | Reduce | Provide export/import functionality. |
| T10 | Inference attacks | Accept | Inherent to the nature of menstrual data. |
| T10 | Inference attacks | Accept | Minimize collected data (already done). |
| T11 | Service worker DoS | Reduce | Provide fallback logic if SW fails. |
| T11 | Service worker DoS | Reduce | Keep SW logic simple. |
| T12 | Legal seizure | Accept | Outside our control; warn users; delete data button. |
| T12 | Legal seizure | Accept | Optional local encryption. |
| T13 | Malicious forks | Reduce | Document official URLs. |
| T13 | Malicious forks | Reduce | Encourage code signing or integrity verification where possible. |
This threat model is intentionally incomplete and will evolve. Its purpose is to improve shared understanding and guide security decisions, not to guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities.